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-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch73
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 73 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c507ed3ea87..00000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From a4d3fbdff1e3ca8f87642af2ac8752c30c617a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 15:45:02 -0400
-Subject: yylex: Make lexer fatal errors actually be fatal
-
-When presented with a command that can't be tokenized to anything
-smaller than YYLMAX characters, the parser calls YY_FATAL_ERROR(errmsg),
-expecting that will stop further processing, as such:
-
- #define YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION \
- yyg->yytext_ptr = yy_bp; \
- yyleng = (int) (yy_cp - yy_bp); \
- yyg->yy_hold_char = *yy_cp; \
- *yy_cp = '\0'; \
- if ( yyleng >= YYLMAX ) \
- YY_FATAL_ERROR( "token too large, exceeds YYLMAX" ); \
- yy_flex_strncpy( yytext, yyg->yytext_ptr, yyleng + 1 , yyscanner); \
- yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yy_cp;
-
-The code flex generates expects that YY_FATAL_ERROR() will either return
-for it or do some form of longjmp(), or handle the error in some way at
-least, and so the strncpy() call isn't in an "else" clause, and thus if
-YY_FATAL_ERROR() is *not* actually fatal, it does the call with the
-questionable limit, and predictable results ensue.
-
-Unfortunately, our implementation of YY_FATAL_ERROR() is:
-
- #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \
- do { \
- grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \
- } while (0)
-
-The same pattern exists in yyless(), and similar problems exist in users
-of YY_INPUT(), several places in the main parsing loop,
-yy_get_next_buffer(), yy_load_buffer_state(), yyensure_buffer_stack,
-yy_scan_buffer(), etc.
-
-All of these callers expect YY_FATAL_ERROR() to actually be fatal, and
-the things they do if it returns after calling it are wildly unsafe.
-
-Fixes: CVE-2020-10713
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a4d3fbdff1e3ca8f87642af2ac8752c30c617a3e]
-CVE: CVE-2020-10713
-Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
----
- grub-core/script/yylex.l | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/grub-core/script/yylex.l b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
-index 7b44c37b7..b7203c823 100644
---- a/grub-core/script/yylex.l
-+++ b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
-@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
-
- /*
- * As we don't have access to yyscanner, we cannot do much except to
-- * print the fatal error.
-+ * print the fatal error and exit.
- */
- #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \
- do { \
-- grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \
-+ grub_fatal (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg));\
- } while (0)
-
- #define COPY(str, hint) \
---
-cgit v1.2.1
-