diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch | 135 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.14.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb) | 5 |
2 files changed, 2 insertions, 138 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch deleted file mode 100644 index dc97c6b4ebe..00000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2021-28861.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ -From 4dc2cae3abd75f386374d0635d00443b897d0672 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Miss Islington (bot)" - <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> -Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 01:42:52 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] gh-87389: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in - http.server. (GH-93879) (GH-94094) - -Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when -an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header -with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix -proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan). - -Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google]. -(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e) - -Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org> - -Signed-off-by: Riyaz Khan <Riyaz.Khan@kpit.com> - -CVE: CVE-2021-28861 - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/4dc2cae3abd75f386374d0635d00443b897d0672] - ---- - Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++ - Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 ++++++++++++++++++- - ...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++ - 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst - -diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py -index 38f7accad7a3..39de35458c38 100644 ---- a/Lib/http/server.py -+++ b/Lib/http/server.py -@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ def parse_request(self): - return False - self.command, self.path = command, path - -+ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect -+ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts -+ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI -+ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path. -+ if self.path.startswith('//'): -+ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single / -+ - # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive. - try: - self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile, -diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py -index 87d4924a34b3..fb026188f0b4 100644 ---- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py -+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py -@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ class request_handler(NoLogRequestHandler, SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): - pass - - def setUp(self): -- BaseTestCase.setUp(self) -+ super().setUp() - self.cwd = os.getcwd() - basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() - os.chdir(basetempdir) -@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ def tearDown(self): - except: - pass - finally: -- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self) -+ super().tearDown() - - def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None): - def close_conn(): -@@ -414,6 +414,55 @@ def test_undecodable_filename(self): - self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK, - data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE) - -+ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self): -+ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location. -+ -+ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host. -+ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389 -+ -+ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot -+ resolve into a redirect to another server. -+ """ -+ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory')) -+ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory' -+ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash -+ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does -+ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic. -+ response = self.request(url) -+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) -+ location = response.getheader('Location') -+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!') -+ -+ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash -+ attack_url = f'/{url}' -+ response = self.request(attack_url) -+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) -+ location = response.getheader('Location') -+ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location) -+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, -+ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and ' -+ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.') -+ -+ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash -+ attack3_url = f'//{url}' -+ response = self.request(attack3_url) -+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) -+ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location) -+ -+ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http -+ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed -+ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head -+ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen. -+ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}' -+ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/' -+ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url) -+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) -+ location = response.getheader('Location') -+ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if -+ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that -+ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header. -+ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location) -+ - def test_get(self): - #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer - response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test') -diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst -new file mode 100644 -index 000000000000..029d437190de ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst -@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ -+:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server -+when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial -+fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan. diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.14.bb index d87abe23513..035eda9ecde 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.14.bb @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0001-python3-Do-not-hardcode-lib-for-distutils.patch \ file://0020-configure.ac-setup.py-do-not-add-a-curses-include-pa.patch \ file://makerace.patch \ - file://CVE-2021-28861.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \ @@ -43,8 +42,8 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \ file://0001-Don-t-search-system-for-headers-libraries.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c4b7100dcaace9d33ab1fda9a3a038d6" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6f309077012040aa39fe8f0c61db8c0fa1c45136763299d375c9e5756f09cf57" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "78710eed185b71f4198d354502ff62c9" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d77e278271ba803e9909a41a4f3baca006181c93ada682a5e5fe8dc4a24c5f3" # exclude pre-releases for both python 2.x and 3.x UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "[Pp]ython-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+).tar" |